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Sometime in the late 1920s, Anna Freud told Sandor Ferenczi: "you really treat your patients 
as I treat the children whom I analyse" (Ferenczi 1930, p. 440).  Ferenczi had to admit that 
she was right. The emergence of child-psychoanalysis after the First World War created a 
paradigmatic shift not only for the new professional child-psychoanalysts like Anna Freud, 
but also for the older generation of therapists, like Ferenczi, who treated mainly adults. 
Ferenczi was particularly interested in knowing more about the new 'child-patient', but 
nevertheless he believed that he already knew something about it through his own experience 
with 'regressed' adult-patients.  'Regression' became, in the 1920s, a major concept in the 
Ferenczian way of thinking, as well as a subject of debate in the psychoanalytical world as a 
whole. Ferenczi's late 1920s pioneering initiative to develop the concept of regression as a 
method of treatment took some of its inspiration from the new discipline of child-
psychoanalysis, but very soon regression became a controversial issue among psychoanalysts, 
especially between Ferenczi himself and Freud.  
Ferenczi was aware of the fact that, for analysts like him who treated mainly adults, child 
psychoanalytic techniques were relevant not only to understanding children but also in as 
much as they could be used to understand adult-patients who had entered into regressive 
states from their early past. On the one hand he "[had] very little to do with children 
analytically" (Ferenczi 1931, p. 469), but on the other hand he claimed that regressive 
treatments of adults could be very similar to the treatment of children.  In 1931 he argued that 
"certain facts of analytic experience [have] grouped themselves in my mind round ideas 
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which urge me to temper materially the antithesis, hitherto so sharp, between the analysis of 
children and that of adults" (ibid).A year later he wrote: "We talk a good deal in analysis of 
regressions into the infantile, but we do not really believe to what great extent we are 
right…The patient gone off into his trance is a child indeed who no longer reacts to 
intellectual explanations, only perhaps to maternal friendliness" (Ferenczi 1949 [1933], p. 
227).    
Reading Ferenczi's later writings might give the impression that Ferenczi had in mind three 
kinds of patients: the child patient, the conventional adult patient and the regressed adult 
patient. Since he had little clinical experience with child-patients, he tried to learn as much as 
he could from his clinical experience with regressed adult patients, in order to find some links 
between his work and that of his new contemporaries – the child-psychoanalysts. Therefore, 
his discussion with Anna Freud was not only an attempt to find some similarities between her 
child patients and his regressed adult patients, but was also part of his effort to legitimize his 
approach to regression as an active therapy with positive results. This re-enactment of 
childish behavior and Ferenczi's encouragement of this regressive state as a method of 
treatment explains his strong affinity with Anna Freud: they both assume that the childish 
mind is always a target for intervention by an authoritarian adult figure.  
Regression itself, however, is a vague term. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as a 
'reversion to an earlier or less developed psychological state, either as a defensive response to 
circumstances, or as a result of hypnosis, psychoanalysis, or psychotherapy'.1 But one may 
fairly ask what it actually is in its psychoanalytical context. Is it only a general metaphor, 
used by the 'psy' professions to reveal one's mental-abnormalities? Is it an actual mental move 
backwards to concrete developmental stages in one's past? Or perhaps it is an everyday 
experience, which can describe the feeling of each one of us when we smell the cookies 
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which remind us something of our mother's kitchen? In short, is it a pathological mental state 
or is it part of everyone's normal healthy mental condition?  
Many answers have been given to these questions; the history of psychoanalysis provides us 
with different ways of thinking about regression. However, in this paper, I would like to 
examine the history of a particular line of thought about regression, namely the Ferenczian 
one. First, I will briefly review some of the intellectual sources of the notion of regression in 
early psychoanalysis as they were perceived by Ferenczi. Then, I will discuss the work of two 
of Ferenczi's best readers in early and mid-20th century British psychoanalysis, who tried to 
understand the more literal sense of the regressive experience. The first is Ian D. Suttie 
(1889-1935), who published his main works between 1924 and 1935.  The second is Michael 
Balint, who came to England in 1939 from Budapest, but who published his main writings in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Their understandings of the term regression were slightly different, but 
nevertheless they both believed that it is impossible to define regression only in pathological 
terms; to some extant, they maintained, each one of us experiences regressive states 
frequently in our daily life.   
*** 
  
In his Interpretation of Dreams, Freud distinguished between three kinds of 
regression:  
(a) topographical regression, in the sense of the schematic picture of the ψ[psi]-
systems […]; (b) temporal regression, in so far as what is in question is a 
harking back to older psychical structures; and (c) formal regression, where 
primitive methods of expression and representation take the place of the usual 
ones (Freud 1900, 548). 
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In their dictionary of psychoanalysis, Laplanche and Pontalis state: 'Freud introduces the idea 
of regression in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) in order to account for an essential 
characteristic of dreams: the dream-thoughts arise for the most part in the form of sensory 
images which impose themselves upon the subject in a quasi-hallucinatory fashion. The 
explanation of this trait calls for a topographical conception of the psychical apparatus which 
views it as made up of an ordered succession of systems. In the waking state, these systems 
are traversed by excitations in a progressive direction (travelling from perception towards 
motor activity); during sleep, by contrast, the thoughts, finding their access to motor activity 
barred, regress towards the perceptual system' (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, p. 386). Formal 
regression is linked to the hierarchical structure of the psychical systems: regression from 
secondary to primary process is a major example. Temporal regression, according to 
Laplanche and Pontalis, 'denotes the subject's reversion to past phases of his development 
(libidinal stages, object-relationships, identifications, etc.)' (ibid.). In other words, to say that 
one is in a regressive state is to say that one behaves, and sometimes feels as if he really has 
returned to an earlier developmental stage as an infant, child or adolescent. Another 
important distinction made by Laplanche and Pontalis, is concerned with the difference 
between regression as a description, and regression as a literal phenomenon. Freud, as they 
pointed out, thought of regression as a descriptive concept, but a tradition developed in 
psychoanalysis of defining it in a much more literal way. As Laplanche and Pontalis 
maintained, it is not the same, for example, to describe someone as 'an obsessional subject 
[who] has regressed to the anal stage' as to say of a schizophrenic that he turned back 'into a 
baby at the breast' (ibid., p. 388). The former is a structural description of one's psyche, while 
the latter is an enactment of a person's most extreme feelings. 
One of the main questions, then, regarding 'regression' is whether it was merely perceived by 
the psychoanalytical community and its related circles as a useful metaphor or whether there 
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was a real belief in the regressive process as a scientific description of what takes place in the 
mind. In other words, how far did Freud and his followers conceptualise 'regression' as an 
actual phenomenon, as opposed to a manner of speaking about something more elusive. This 
is an historical question, since each of the psychoanalytic communities in Europe and 
elsewhere perceived the concept of regression in very different ways.  
*** 
 
A full history of the evolution of the concept of regression would necessarily include 
notable nineteenth-century biologists, psychologists, and social-scientists, such as Lamarck, 
Darwin and Lombroso; this project is beyond our scope. For our purposes, however, perhaps 
the most relevant among these 19th century figures is the German biologist, Ernest Haeckel.  
Haeckel was one of the main popularizers of Darwin in Germany, but by the second half of 
the 19th century he himself had become very famous. By the middle of the 1860s, he 
developed his own theory of evolution, known as the theory of recapitulation, or as the 
'biogenetic law'.2  
The theory of recapitulation was famously known for the claim that 'ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny'. Haeckel, who coined these terms, explained that 'phylogeny is the developmental 
history of the abstract, genealogical individual; ontogeny, on the other hand, is the 
developmental history of the concrete, morphological individual' (cf. Gould 1977, p. 80).  
Stephen Jay Gould explained Haeckel's theory as the view that 'an organism, during the 
course of its embryonic growth, passes through a series of stages representing adult ancestors 
in their proper historical order' (Gould 2002, p. 248). In other words, traits of the evolutionary 
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Richards' claims in his book is that even though 'Haeckel's great sin in the eyes of many historians and 
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process of the humankind as distinct from other biological species can be found in each one 
of us. Haeckel thought of it mainly in physiological terms, but many other adherents, 
including Freudians adherents, wanted to take it even further and to claim a parallel between 
ontogeny and phylogeny also on the mental and psychological level. 3 
Freud, however, was not the only nineteenth century social theorist influenced by this 'theory 
of recapitulation'. Among those who adopted its principles were the biologist and political 
theorist Herbert Spencer4 (1820-1903) and his follower, the neurologist John Hughlings 
Jackson5 (1835-1911). It is the latter who particularly emphasized that any notion of 
evolution must contain the possibility for the reverse process, that is, a process of 
'dissolution'. This concept was crucial for his neurological theory of mental illness, since he 
described insanity as dissolution of the progressive regions of the mind towards an 
evolutionarily more primitive stage of the mind. It is no wonder that Freud was deeply 
influenced by Jackson's ideas6, and that he is considered by contemporary psychoanalytic 
literature as the precursor of the notion of regression (Blum 1994, pp. 61-61; Dowling 2004, 
pp. 197-201).   
Ferenczi was no less enthusiastic about the possibility of synthesising Haeckelian notions 
with psychoanalysis.  He considered himself to be 'an adherent of Haeckel's recapitulation 
theory, according to which the developmental history of the individual is an abbreviated 
repetition of the developmental history of the species' (Ferenczi 1924, p. 103). He claimed, 
however, that this theory could be used not only to explain phylogeny but also to explain the 
history of the entire species (palingenesis). In his book Thalassa (1924), Ferenczi suggested a 
new theory of parallelism between ontogeny, phylogeny and palingenesis, and thought that by 
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this approach he could show that the theories of recapitulation and psychoanalysis were 
complementary.  
There are some traces of his Freudian-Haeckelian ambitions in Ferenczi’s very early 
psychoanalytic writings. In 1912, for example, he argued that déjà vu is a kind of regression 
into our primal stage as embryos. Our body recapitulates some traits of this historical phase 
of ours, and that trait can be revealed in a later stage as déjà vu. Ferenczi acquired much of 
this line of thought from his patients themselves. For instance, in a case published in 1912, he 
suggested to one of his patients that her sensitivity to her fiancé's bad smell was a reaction to 
his confession that he had been with other women before her. When Ferenczi gave his 
interpretation, she reacted by saying that she felt that moment, in the treatment room, as 'it 
has all happened to me before!' (Ferenczi 1912, p. 320).  Ferenczi explained to her that she 
was having a déjà vu; she replied: 
'We used to say [in our childhood] that the reason why things sometimes struck us 
as so familiar was because we had met them before, when we were still frogs!' I 
drew her attention to the fact that, when she was still a 'frog' (an embryo), she had 
really been in most intimate contact with another woman's body (her mother's), 
and moreover in close proximity with organs and excreta the smell of which (as I 
already knew) were extremely repulsive to her (ibid.). 
Even though Freud did not mention the word déjà vu, it seems likely that seven years later, he 
was drawing on some of Ferenczi's ideas in his easy on the 'Uncanny'; he writes: 'there is a 
joking saying that "Love is home-sickness" and whenever a man dreams of a place or a 
country and says to himself, while he is still dreaming: "this place is familiar to me, I've been 
here before", we may interpret the place as being his mother's genitals or her body.'(Freud 
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1919, 245). 7 As we shall see later on, the idea of getting back to the womb had preoccupied 
the psychoanalytic discourse of regression for many years and in many ways. 
In Thalassa, described by Freud as 'perhaps the boldest application of psycho-analysis that 
was ever attempted' (Freud 1933, p. 228), Ferenczi provided his most radical ideas on the 
'regressive'. He put forward the hypothesis that the whole earth used to be one big ocean, 
where the only form of life was an idealized 'aquatic mode of existence'(Ferenczi 1924, 52). 
But the recession of the oceans created a huge catastrophe for all living things, and forced 
them to begin the evolutionary process of species development:  
For, we reflected, what if the entire intrauterine existence of the higher mammals 
were only a replica of the type of existence which characterized that aboriginal 
piscine period, and birth itself nothing but a recapitulation on the part of the 
individual of the great catastrophe which at the time of the recession of the ocean 
forced so many animals, and certainly our own animal ancestors, to adapt 
themselves to a land existence, above all to renounce gill-breathing and provide 
themselves with organs for the respiration of air? (ibid., p. 45, italics in original) 
However, according to Ferenczi, it was not only the respiratory system which had to be 
provided: we can read the development of the entire human body as a response to this 
catastrophe. For instance, Ferenczi had no doubt that fish are not a symbol for the penis, as is 
traditional in many cultures, but the other way around: the penis was created by the 
evolutionary process to enact the life of a fish swimming in the water, in order to satisfy a 
human desire to regress into the timeless heavenly thalassic times. In fact, the act of coitus 
itself, suggested Ferenczi, is not only a mean of procreation, but the reliving of the 'aquatic 
mode of existence': 
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It is possible for us to think of coitus and sleep as the conducting off of current 
traumatic stimuli and, at the same time, the expression of the striving to reproduce 
the intrauterine and thalassal situation seemingly long since transcended – nay, we 
could even perceive in them a return to still more archaic and primitive strivings 
towards repose... (ibid., pp. 84-85). 
We can find here some of the views which Ferenczi developed in his discussions with Freud 
during World War I about the possibility of developing a Lamarckian psychoanalysis. As 
Freud wrote to Ferenczi in 22 December, 1916: 'our project, “Lamarck and ΨA,” suddenly 
came to mind as hopeful and rich in content. I am predicting all kinds of things there and am 
actually already convinced about it.'8 Almost a year later, in a letter to Karl Abraham of 11 
November, 1917 Freud wrote:  
Have I really not told you about the Lamarck idea? It arose between Ferenczi and me, 
but neither of us has the time or spirit to tackle it at present. The idea is to put 
Lamarck entirely on our ground and to show that his “need”, which creates and 
transforms organs, is nothing but the power of Ucs. ideas over one's own body, of 
which we see remnants in hysteria, in short the “omnipotence of thoughts” (Falzeder 
2002, p. 361). 
Freud, however, did not find again after 1918 'the time or spirit to tackle' the subject and 
abandoned this ambitious project. It was Ferenczi alone who had to keep this speculative line 
of thought of putting 'Lamarck entirely on our ground'. For him, Lamarckianism was strongly 
related to his clinical attempts to achieve what he considered as the main goal of 
psychoanalytic research, that is, exploring the inner mechanism of psychosomatic phenomena 
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– best exemplified by the 'hysteric woman', but after the War also by the 'shell-shocked 
soldier'. In hysteria, he said in 1921, 'the pathogenic psychic material of the hysteric can use 
the associated physical memory material [körperllicher Erinnerungmaterials] as a means of 
expression'(Ferenczi 1921a, p. 29). It is as if for Ferenczi 'physical memory' was the way to 
explain the regressive mechanism that enables hysteria – the mechanism of what Freud 
thought of as the 'omnipotence of thoughts'. 
  But 'physical memory' was also the missing link for showing that 'ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny' and how it works also on the mental level. As the philosopher of science Patricia 
Kitcher pointed out, "if Lamarck was right and recapitulation true, then it was reasonable to 
construe childhood and neurotic behaviour (which allegedly involved a regression to 
childhood forms) in terms of the practices and experiences of primitive humans; it was 
reasonable to hypothesize a primitive portion of the mind in which this material was stored" 
(Kitcher 2007, p. 241). It was precisely this mixture of psychoanalysis with Haeckelian-
Lamarckian evolutionism that many scientists and social theorists fiercely rejected. One of 
them was the Scottish psychiatrist, Ian D. Suttie, who criticized Freud's psycho-biological 
speculations in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Suttie 1924), but his critique was equally 
valid when directed to Ferenczi's Thalassa. Rather than thinking of regression in biological 
terms, Suttie –  who was in many other respects one of Ferenczi's admirers in Britain –  
suggested that we consider regression as much more a social-cultural concept. However, 
before getting into Suttie's views on regression, a brief review of the usage of 'regression' in 
British psychoanalysis in the interwar period would be useful.  
 *** 
As with Freud and Ferenczi, who developed their views on regression in the light of earlier, 
nineteenth-century biological models, many early twentieth century British psychiatrists and 
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psychologists also gave priority to biology in discussing this topic. Many interwar British 
social scientists tended to describe the human condition as a continuing struggle between 
primitive animal instincts and the 'human will' (Loughran 2007). W.H.R Rivers, for instance, 
defined regression as a state 'in which an instinctive process characteristic of infancy persists 
in its capacity for activity in later years' (Rivers, 1922, p.152). Moreover, he perceived 
regression as a collapse of the 'controlling forces' (Rivers, 1922, p. 119) of the mind, and the 
returning of man to a much more primitive stage in biological evolution.  
The psychoanalytical view of regression was not so different from this mainstream medical 
approach – not surprisingly, since Rivers had worked under Jackson in 1890 and explicitly 
drew on his work; they all tended to believe in some primal biological instincts as the source 
of the regressive phenomena (Loughran, 14-15). But the question was not necessarily what is 
the best way to define regression, but in what cases regression can be used and in what 
context. The popular British psychologist William McDougall, for instance, used this term 'in 
a purely descriptive sense, without meaning to imply any theory of the process or condition' 
(McDougall 1920, p. 136). What is more, he argued that his interest in publishing cases of 
severe regression of shell-shock soldiers, was precisely because 
Among all the wealth of cases presenting an immense variety of combinations of 
symptoms and conditions, these cases, in which the dominant feature is regression to 
early childhood, seem to have been comparatively rare, and the nature of the 
condition and of the processes involved in its onset remain to my mind obscure and 
deserving of further discussion (ibid.). 
McDougall addressed this statement directly to those psychoanalytical circles that used 
regression in a much more metaphorical sense and for much wider purposes.9 Indeed, this 
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word had become part of the psychoanalytic jargon in clinical descriptions of patients10; but 
in that period people were also using it as part of their attempts to deploy psychoanalytic 
theory in other disciplines of the humanities and the social sciences. This was the case, for 
example, in the study of delinquency, which became very dominant in interwar Britain. 
Criminality was not anymore only a moral sin, but also a sign of psychological regression. 
Many interwar researchers into delinquency took the psychoanalytic view and 
explored the 'analogy between criminal acts and childish phantasies' (Klein 1927, p. 191). 
Roger Money-Kyrle, for example, explained that according to psychoanalysis there are three 
developmental stages – oral, anal, and genital – but only the normal individual 'has reached 
the final stage' (Money-Kyrle 1928, p. 280), while the neurotic and the pervert 'are fixed at a 
more primitive level' (ibid.). He maintained that '[these] pre-genital characters fall roughly 
into two types – the incompetent and criminal. The repressions of the criminal will only 
permit him to function anti-socially' (ibid.). And so Edward Glover, the leading figure among 
psychoanalysts in the study of adolescent delinquency, claimed that 'drug-addiction acts as a 
protection against psychotic reaction in states of regression' (Glover 1932, p. 315).  
Regression in its psychoanalytic sense was perceived as a culturally induced condition 
responsible for much of abnormal, pathological and anti-social behavior. Recognizing 
people's regressive states became central to the interwar understanding of, and the 
development of solutions to, all sorts of medical-social problems, specifically to all kinds of 
antisocial behavior, 'from bed-wetting to train-wrecking' (Winnicott 1957, p. 117), to use 
Winnicott's phrase.   
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Regression became also a popular concept for analysts in their cultural observations. 
Ella Sharpe, for example, gave her psychoanalytic interpretation of Hamlet, claiming that 'the 
study of the particular nature of the regression gives us an understanding of that 'Hamlet' 
quality which makes the Oedipus situation in his case so peculiarly fascinating and 
individual' (Sharpe 1929, p. 270).  Ernest Jones wrote in his essay on chess that 'all games are 
apt at times to be marred by unsportsmanlike behaviour, i.e. by the sublimation undergoing a 
regression to its asocial origins, but with chess the strain is exceptionally great' (Jones 1931, 
p. 5). David Eder in his historical-sociological paper 'The Myth of Progress', said that 'we 
refuse to recognize that this myth is but a regression to an infant's phantasy now enthroned in 
our super-ego. Once upon a time it was an introjected authority; now it figures as something 
independent – God, Progress, our Higher Self' (Eder 1932, p. 9).  
It was only after the Second World War that we can recognize a shift in the psychoanalytic 
discourse in Britain in the usage of regression from metaphorical register to that of the real 
studying regressive phenomena as legitimate experiences for scientific investigation. The 
word regression was used less to describe unacceptable behaviour, and much more to 
designate a real mental state, now perceived as an unavoidable state in some circumstances 
which can appear in each of us at some stage in our lives. Ian Suttie was in many respects a 
precursor of these trends within post Second World War psychoanalysis. 
 
*** 
Suttie was born in Glasgow, and received his medical degree from Glasgow University in 
1914. After the outbreak of the First World War he joined the Royal Army Medical Corps, 
and served in France and the Middle East. After the war he returned to become a psychiatrist 
at the Glasgow Royal Asylum, where he also met his wife, the psychiatrist, Dr Jane 
Robertson. In 1928 Ian joined the Tavistock Clinic in London as a clinical assistant, and in 
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1933 he was appointed a full member of staff (Jane was appointed a clinical assistant at 
Tavistock in 1931). Henry Dicks, who worked with Ian Suttie at Tavistock, remembered him 
as 'a lively spirit who soon organized private discussion meetings in which Tavistock staff 
were engaged in most amicable but also quite rigorous doctrinal discussions with their 
psychoanalytic "opponents"' (Dicks 1970, p. 40). However, in 1935 he died, when he was 
only 46. 'His premature death was much mourned by us', writes Dicks (ibid.). 
We have some good reasons to think that Suttie was a good reader of Ferenczi, and that the 
latter did influence the way in which he thought of regression. First, his wife and co-author, 
Jane Isabel Suttie, translated the second volume of Ferenczi's writings into English (Ferenczi 
1926); as they were working closely, they probably did share some of Ferenczi's ideas 
between themselves.11  Suttie also referred to Ferenczi in his writings a few times, though not 
as frequently as one might expect. Finally, Suttie shared some of Ferenczi's ideas and 
approaches in his clinical technique. He appreciated what he considered as the main 
Ferenczian contribution – the notion that 'it is the physician's love that heals the patient' 
(Suttie 1935a, 75). 
His only book, The Origins of Love and Hate (Suttie 1935a), together with a few earlier 
articles, contains a radical critique of the Freudian concept of the father as the origin of 
sociability in human beings. It is the mother and not the father, argued Suttie, who is 
responsible for our basic mental orientations towards other people. In her relations with her 
infant, the mother is the one who creates the paradigm for sociability in the infant's mind. The 
relationship with the mother precedes any other kind of relationship and, according to Suttie, 
it is the only relationship which is originally 'natural' and not socially constructed. For 
example, claimed Suttie, there is nothing essentially 'natural' in some socio-cultural premisses 
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about the superiority of man over women, or the father over the mother, in modern 
patriarchal society. On the contrary, the only thing which is essentially 'natural' in a newborn 
infant is his or her 'simple attachment-to-mother who is the sole source of food and 
protection' (Suttie 1935a, p. 15). 
The father, according to Suttie, plays a role only after this basic bond between the mother and 
her infant has already been created.  He is excluded from the initial natural intimacy between 
the mother and her child, and therefore he develops a strong jealousy of their relationship.  
This new way of looking at the father enables Suttie to turn the entire Oedipal structure on its 
head: 
[In the Oedipus complex] the child's incestuous desire then would serve as an excuse 
for the father's interference, disguising his own regressive jealousy. We are not for a 
moment implying that the conditions described by Freud do not in fact exist...We 
hold, however, that this conflict is not the necessary and universal state of affairs that 
Freud imagines it to be; that the initial jealousy does not come from the child and is 
not of a genital nature, but rather springs from the associative impulse (Suttie and 
Suttie 1932, p.212). 
The jealousy which Suttie described leads to patriarchal society, or what Ian and Jane Suttie 
described as 'Oedipus culture', which 'manifests itself in anti-feminism, anti-sexuality, a 
neurotic dread of mother incest and of mother-worship, and therefore in a propitiatory father 
worship and the attribution to a paternal god of all creative and moral powers' (Suttie and 
Suttie 1932, p. 230). It was this Oedipus culture that brought Suttie to suggest the mother-
infant bond not only as an alternative model for a better psychoanalysis12, but also as an 
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utopian starting point for creating a better society – a society which will not suffer from what 
Suttie described as 'the taboo on tenderness' (Suttie 1935, pp. 80-96). This idea – central to 
Suttie's thought – was probably referring to Ferenczi's famous last article, 'Confusion of the 
Tongues between the Adults and the Child – (The Language of Tenderness and of Passion)' 
['Sprachverwirrung zwischen den Erwachsenen und dem Kind. Die Sprache der Zärtlichkeit 
und der Leidenschaft '] (Ferenczi 1949[1933]). 
However, it is important to note that even if Suttie was a strong protagonist of the 
'maternal', it does not necessarily mean that he was a feminist in its modern sense. Suttie 
idealized some matriarchal pre-modern societies, because 'if matriarchal cult, myth, theology, 
initiation ritual and sacrifice deal with and give expression predominantly to regressive 
longings and jealousies, the patriarchal equivalents deal mainly with precocity and 
repression'(Suttie 1935a, p. 133). However, when Suttie comes to explain what matriarchy 
actually is, he describes it as 'a society where the woman is the effective head of the 
household' (ibid., p. 120). According to Suttie, the mother is the ruler of the children, and she 
has to get the full recognition for that. Once she is fully empowered, and restored to her old 
position as the 'ruler of the household' – as was allegedly the case in some old matriarchal 
societies – children will grow up in a much more positive, social and loving environment, 
without the damaging influence of an envious father. These children will be much more 
capable, claimed Suttie, of living together with other people, with decisive social 
consequences. In contrast to what he perceived as Freud's tendency to dismiss the role of the 
mother, Suttie suggested maternity as a possible way of getting back into the communal 
harmony which he believed characterized the pre-modern period.  
In his article 'Religion: Racial Character and Mental and Social Health' (Suttie 1932), Suttie 
made the distinction between pre-Christian Teutonic cultures, which were based on love, and 
western patriarchal cultures, which were based on guilt. In this context Suttie gave a special 
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place to Judaism, the source for the religions of the father, that is, the religions of guilt. 
Christianity, according to Suttie, is also essentially patriarchal, but, at least in its early 
versions, it emphasized and encouraged love and brotherhood among its believers as its main 
set of values. It is precisely these values, so important for early Christianity, that were absent 
in Judaism, Lutheranism and Calvinism.13 By enforcing their patriarchal ideology, he 
claimed, these religions created the conditions for some damaging individualistic forms of 
life, which did not exist before the modern age. For example, possessiveness and the need for 
property in its modern sense, are a direct consequence of the 'forced renunciation of the 
primal baby-mother intimacy', which creates 'dissatisfaction with, and distrust of, the social 
environment which comes gradually and more or less adequately to fill the place in affective 
life originally occupied by the mother'(Suttie 1935b). This primal loss of the intimacy with 
the mother creates an anxiety about loneliness and solitude, and an existential fear that the 
basic social needs of the individual will be ignored. This feeling of helplessness could be the 
source for destructive behaviour, but not the other way around. According to Suttie, no one 
has any 'death instinct', as Freud believed, or any other primal destructive instincts, as argued 
by Melanie Klein; aggressive behaviour arises only after the loss of the 'mother rapport'. That 
is to say, love exists before any hate, jealousy or envy appears.  
In order to support his claim, Suttie examined a wide range of myths and folklore 
from pre-modern European societies and 'primitive' cultures; some of his writings are a 
mixture of mythologies, descriptions of cults and ethnological explanations from many 
different places. As a result, his concept of the 'pre-Western-modern' seems many times to be 
more imaginative and idealized than historical and real, and it is not always clear which pre-
modern society exactly Suttie is longing for. However, among all these non-Jewish, non-
protestant and non-modern old traditions, his deepest appreciation was, perhaps, for what he 
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 See, Gerson 2009a, p.28. 
18 
 
imagined to be the 'pagan' culture, because of what he thought as the positive approach of 
pagans to regressive phenomena: 
Psychologically, one might describe 'the pagan' as taking parental love for 
granted. He is willing, therefore, on the one hand, to surrender the privileges of 
infancy for the responsibilities of adulthood, while unafraid, on the other, to take 
and enjoy the pleasure and privileges of the latter state. He has steered his 
development between the Charybdis of infantile regression and the Scylla of 
Oedipus-precocity, and so he is left without distrust in himself or unconscious fear 
of incurring parental wrath and separation (Suttie 1935, p. 155). 
For Suttie, then, the only reason why regression was perceived as a pathological phenomenon 
was because of the ways in which notions of 'infancy' and 'adulthood' are construed by 
western modern societies. These societies, he claimed, are dominated by the denunciation of 
the first attachment of the child to his mother. Therefore, any regressive phenomenon in 
adulthood is perceived as an attempt to recover this primal bond with the mother, and 
therefore as a threat to the paternal order.  
Looking at the history of pre-modern cultures can suggest some positive ways of 
thinking about regression in people's daily lives. Suttie considered that many people wrongly 
perceived regression as a symptom of deeper pathology. He maintained that as it was a 
legitimate and understandable mental state in the past, it could also be so again in the future, 
in a different sort of society with different sorts of values. Indeed, for him, a regressive state 
could be a sign of a healthy relationship in a healthy family. He took the view as we have 
already noted, that healthy families are those which have not abandoned the importance of 
the maternal role. However, this notion of maternity as a primary paradigm for any kind of 
healthy social relationship had its full impact within the British psychoanalytic movement 
only after the Second World War, with the work of Michal Balint, D.W. Winnicott (1896-
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1971) and John Bowlby14 (1907-1990). Balint, who was known in Britain and elsewhere as 
Sandor Ferenczi’s most remarkable pupil and successor, will be the topic of the last section of 
this paper. 
*** 
Before the Second World War, Michael Balint was one of the senior members of what 
was known today as the psychoanalytic 'Budapest School', famous among other things for its 
psychosomatic approach, that is to say, bringing the body to the fore in psychoanalytic 
discourse. It was also known for its interdisciplinary approach, and some of its members were 
pioneering figures in applying psychoanalysis to other disciplines, particularly in 
anthropology (see Moreau-Ricaud 1996; Vikar 1996; Young-Bruehl 2002). But the 
psychoanalytic movement in Budapest was also a target for the fascist regime throughout the 
interwar period, and many of its senior members left during this time to Berlin and New 
York. Balint, however, stayed in Budapest after 1924, and became the senior figure in 
Hungarian psychoanalysis after Ferenczi's death in 1933. By the beginning of 1939 he too 
was forced to leave Budapest and managed to arrive to London with his wife Alice – herself a 
psychoanalyst. He was obliged to requalify to practise in Scotland before he got a job as a 
'child guidance clinic director' in Manchester, where Alice died. After the war, Balint moved 
to London, where he was appointed to the Tavistock institute, and later on he opened his own 
private practice. During the 1950s and 1960s he was recognized as one of Britain's leading 
psychoanalysts, and in 1968 he was elected to be the president of the British Psycho-
Analytical Society.15  
Like his teacher, Ferenczi, Balint also claimed there were crucial therapeutic advantages in 
bringing patients to a state in which they relived scenes from their childhoods, and sometimes 
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 Bowlby was also the only one among the leading figures of 1950s psychoanalysis in Britain, who fully 
acknowledged his debt to Suttie. See, Cassullo 2010, p. 7.  
15
  See, Moreau-Ricaud 2002.   
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behaved as if they really had become children again. But he also claimed that we experience 
regressive states all the time in our everyday lives, and recognizing these mental dispositions 
can help us to improve our social life in the public sphere.  
For him, the regressive state of some people reflects an inherent 'confusion of 
tongues', which exists in any authoritarian relationship: between parents and their children, in 
the class room at school, between workers and their managers, etc. This concept of 'confusion 
of tongues' was taken by Balint from the title of Ferenczi's article, published first in 1933 
(Ferenczi 1949[1933]), in which Ferenczi claimed that the paradigm for any mental trauma is 
a primal 'confusion of tongues' between the child and his parents. That is to say, that there is a 
traumatic gap between any child and her mother and father, since the child requires many 
things which she cannot achieve without internalizing her parents’ inner self and making his 
or her own psychic structure adjust to theirs.  In other words, the child is forced not only to 
imitate the parents' conscious language, behaviour and social norms, but also their 
unconscious ones. This confusion of tongues is the source of many regressive states in life, 
when a person in a relationship of authority re-enacts a very private mode of maladjustment 
to authority derived from his own initial developmental stages. Ferenczi, however, believed 
that severe regressive states can be treated only through regression itself. Only regression can 
enable the patient to enact her initial traumatic events, and so emancipate her from her own 
traumatic confusions of tongues.  
 Here is the place to say a few words about the ambivalent attitude of psychoanalysis towards 
regression as a therapeutic tool, derived in part from its historical link to nineteenth century 
hypnosis. Freud did not want psychoanalysis to be associated in anyway with hypnosis. From 
a medical perspective, he considered it as an unreliable treatment; from an ethical point of 
view, he saw it as an abusive procedure. According to Freud, 'hypnotic treatment seeks to 
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cover up and gloss over something in mental life; analytic treatment seeks to expose and get 
rid of something. The former acts like a cosmetic, the latter like surgery' (Freud 1917, 450). 
 After the First World War, Ferenczi introduced his new 'active technique'(Ferenczi 1919; 
1921; 1924), which made him reconsider the Freudian distinction between 'hypnotic 
treatment' and 'analytic treatment'. In his 'active technique', Ferenczi suggested that in some 
specific cases, the doctor should intervene more actively in the process of free-association. 
For example, he told some 'patients whose symptoms consist in habitual day-dreaming 
forcibly to interrupt these phantasies and to exert all their force in seeking out those psychical 
impressions which have been avoided through fear (phobically), and which have switched the 
patients over on to the tracks of pathological phantasy' (1924, 69). Ferenczi, however, 
insisted that these new interventionist methods are not taken from the hypnotic tradition, and 
are 'invulnerable to the reproach that one is mixing the method of free-association with the 
procedures of suggestion' (ibid.). By using 'active technique', he said, 'we do not deem the 
interpretations we offer to be irrefutable utterances, but regard their validity to be dependent 
on whether they can be verified by material brought forward from memory or by means of 
repetition of earlier situations' (ibid., 69-70). For Ferenczi, then, the 'talking cure' brings 
patients to regressive states ('repetition of earlier situation') in which they reconstruct 
traumatic events of their past during their analysis. Moreover, these regressive states can 
guarantee the reliability of the analytic process itself. In that respect, he considered some 
regressive elements in the relationships of the analyst and his patients to be unavoidable.  
Ferenczi, however, had another problem with his 'active technique'. In order not to become a 
'hypnotist', he tried to keep some distance from his patients in order not to abandon his 
medical objectivity.  However, as Balint stated many years later, 'Ferenczi had to admit to his 
patients that producing the repetition of the traumatic situation by his active intervention, and 
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then watching the events with the customary sympathetic detachment was very similar in 
its structure to the original trauma' (Balint 1979 [1968], 125). In other words, the 'active 
technique' created a role-playing, in which the patient took the role of herself in the traumatic 
event, and the doctor took the role of her offender. It was at this point that Ferenczi started to 
believe that a more benevolent participation of the doctor in this regressive role-playing can 
be a real step forward towards a cure. Rather than repeating the role of an offender from the 
past – usually the patient's carer – the doctor could and should play the role of the good 
parent that the patient never had. 
By the late 1920s, many of Ferenczi's followers considered regression as a necessary 
therapeutic tool for mediating the past and the present of the patient, tracing back her 
traumatic events, and helping her cure by taking an active parental role in the regressive 
situation at the treatment-room.  We can see that while Freud insisted that regressive 
procedures run the risk of the analyst falling into the trap of hypnosis, and become a 
'hypnotist' instead of an analyst, Ferenczi was much less cautious regarding regression: for 
him regression was the core of the treatment itself.  
 For Balint, too, the line between 'regressed patients' and 'children' was not always clear; 
sometimes these two categories had become for him totally conflated. Balint was trying to be 
a good parent for his adult-patient, that is to say, to give back the adult-patient the good 
parenting of which she had been deprived. He attempted to do that by replacing parental 
authority, in the role of the analyst, by parental love in order to create a paradigm of a parent 
who is not an educator but solely a source for 'maternal love', or what he would define as a 
'primary love'. The psychoanalyst, according to Balint, has to fulfil the primary maternal 
needs of his adult-patients, such as the feeling of 'the baby in its mother's arms', the feeling of 
23 
 
'being in love' and the 'feeling of oneness with the universe' (Balint 1955, p. 231). 16 This 
approach, however, led Balint to blur the line between adult and child patients and in the end 
to treat them almost the same. 
Here are two examples of Balint's almost interchangeable usage of the terms 'infant' or 'child' 
and the term 'regressed patient' (italics are mine): 
It is only at this point that I have to go farther and use my findings to infer from 
them what might happen in pre-verbal periods,  that is in early 'childhood' and in 
deeply regressed states. This is a more uncertain, more controversial, field, as we 
all know. The cause of this uncertainty is the dependence of the subject, baby or 
patient, on his environment, that is on the observer. In both situations—earliest 
'childhood', highly regressed patient—the dependence on the environment is an 
essential factor. 
 
The young baby and the regressed patient live in a pre-verbal state, and thus we, 
who set out to be emotionally uninvolved scientific observers, become not only 
participants and partners, but also interpreter-informants, and finally translators 
(ibid., p. 229). 
 
Balint really believed that the infant and the regressed patient are in the same situation: both 
of them, he claimed, are in a pre-verbal stage. On the one hand Balint was aware of the fact 
that a patient - unlike the infant - 'can come back from it [and] can tell something of what 
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 In what follows, I am drawing on Balint's article 'Friendly Expanses—Horrid Empty Spaces' (1955), which 
was incorporated later  into Thrills and Regressions (1959), one of his better known books. Balint developed 
some of his ideas from that period in his later work, The Basic Fault: Therapeutic Aspects of Regression (1968). 
This current article, however, focuses on Balint's earlier work, of the 1950s, and therefore The Basic Fault will 
not be discussed here.      
24 
 
happened to him in his own words' (ibid., p. 237). On the other hand, when the patient is in 
the state of regression itself, he or she 'is beyond the world of words' (ibid.).  So whenever the 
patient is not in a regressed stage he is different from the infant in every possible mental 
aspect, but once he is regressed he becomes no different from the infant in any aspect at all. 
According to Balint, the parent/analyst's role is to translate their infants’/patients’ pre-verbal 
languages into the language of the adults' world.  
But he also defined parents and analysts as inevitably the teachers and the educators of their 
infants/patients: 'both the baby and the regressed patient in the end have no choice but 
learning to speak the language—i.e. vocabulary and grammar—of the adult on whom they 
dependent, the baby for his life, the regressed patient for his restoration' (ibid., p. 230). 
The infant is inherently dependent on the adult because he is in a pre-verbal stage and 
therefore lacks any language to communicate with adults. Therefore, Balint says that 'both the 
baby and the regressed patient have to learn from us how to express themselves so as to be 
understood first by us, then by themselves, and ultimately by their fellow-men' (ibid., p. 237). 
The parent/analyst also becomes the child's educator and teacher, whether he likes it or not. 
The only parental disposition which does not involve practicing any sort of authority is that 
of the baby in its mother's arms.  
'When we start the treatment' he writes 'we offer a set-up to our patients which in almost 
every case induces them to adopt a babyish posture' (ibid. p. 238). This 'babyish posture' is 
the state that the regressed patient should reach: 
These [regressed] patients feel as if they were wrapped up in some cosy, warm, 
structureless darkness which envelops them and protects them from the 
unsympathetic and unfriendly external world, represented quite often by the 
analyst (ibid, p. 237). 
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Here Balint is explicitly suggesting abolishing even the small perceived gap between 
regressed patients and infants and treating the one as we would treat the other. 
One of the main signs of a successful regressive treatment, claimed Balint, is if the patient 
demands that his analyst maintains almost complete silence in the consulting-room and does 
not allow the analyst to interrupt with any interpretations. Balint pointed out that silence 
could be an expression of anxiety and lack of communication between people, but it also 
could be a sign of harmony, peacefulness, confidence and growth. In the context of regressive 
treatments, silence is an expression of a mental state before the pre-verbal stage, the stage in 
which the infant is not even aware of his lack of language. But, one might ask, what is this 
'pre-preverbal' stage? Is there any developmental stage before the preverbal stage, other than 
that of the embryo's existence in the womb? This is the only stage where we had no language 
but that was not a problem – because all our needs were supplied to us biologically by our 
mothers. 
Balint claimed that the 'analyst should become part and parcel of the patient's world.  In fact 
not a separate object at all, but should merge as completely as possible into the '"friendly 
expanses" surrounding the patient' (ibid., p. 239). Does this not mean that the treatment room 
could really supply a regressive experience of this initial integrated stage of the mother and 
her embryo? And is the womb not the only place where the parent-child relationship can be 
seen as not being grounded in dependency, authority, lack of language on one side and 
imposition of language on the other? 
Balint's approach to regression was not limited to his private patients, and he claimed the 
importance of acknowledging and recognizing people's regressive states also in the public 
sphere. At the beginning of the 1950s, Balint and his third wife, Enid, established an 
innovative peer group for general practitioners. Their initial idea was to create a group where 
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physicians would be able to discuss their practical work and particularly their 'psychological 
implications in general medical practice'(Balint 1968 [1957], p. 1). The group included 
fourteen general practitioners and a psychiatrist. They met once a week in London to discuss 
case studies, namely their patients' stories, which were brought by each participant. The 
group included fourteen general practitioners and a psychiatrist. They met once a week in 
London to discuss case studies, namely their patients' stories, which were brought to the 
meetings by each participant. Many cases, however, revealed to the doctors that their patients 
often served only as triggers for debate, and that the real 'case-studies' were the doctors 
themselves – who found themselves investigating the long-term doctor-patient relationship 
from a very personal perspective.  The group also tracked the development of each case in the 
weeks, months, and sometimes years to come. This work with practitioners led Balint to 
publish in 1957 his book The Doctor, His Patient and the Illness, describing the story of the 
first 'Balint group', which has since been the model for Balint groups around the world.  
The theoretical presumption behind Balint's work was that there is no such thing as a 
medically objective diagnosis, but rather the diagnosis is always an inter-subjective process 
negotiated by the doctor and his patient. Thus, the doctor and his patient are always in a 
process of negotiation over the right way to describe a set of symptoms, name them and 
finally treat them.  
In his book, Balint demonstrated the ways in which general practitioners began to think more 
'psychoanalytically', particularly by seeing their patients through the lens of regression. Balint 
believed that regressive situations require doctors to recognize that they are taking part in 
psychological role-playing exercises designed to recreate of their patient's past. More 
awareness of regressive states might enable doctors to understand better their most 
demanding patients, and also to learn whether it is possible to 'read between the lines', so to 
speak, to discover a patient's needs – in terms of body and mind.   He suggested that general 
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practitioners learn how to recognize regressive situations in patients as indications that 
patients need help; and he also suggested that GPs should not look at situations solely from 
the outside but should take a positive role in bringing regressive states to the surface and by 
trying to respond to patients' regressive needs as much possible. 
We must also remember that regression in psychoanalytic thought can be seen as another 
form of 'transference'. By transference I mean what Freud defined as a situation when 'a 
whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as 
applying to the person of the physician at the present moment' (Freud 1905, p. 116). In other 
words, transference is a form of symbolic replacement and role-playing, just as some 
regressive situations could be. The patient replaces a formative person from his past with a 
symbolic authoritarian figure from his present, and thereby creates psychological role-
playing. This is the form of role-playing which can take place also between the doctor and his 
patient.  
For instance, a young female patient had complained of indigestion for three years. When she 
came to ask for tablets, her general practitioner plucked up the courage to ask her a few more 
personal questions. After a short discussion he found out that her father left when she was 
five, and that she had suffered from a domineering mother. The general practitioner gave her 
the opportunity to come and speak with him regularly every week, and his influence on her 
was tremendous. After a while she found the courage to confront her mother, and became 
engaged to her boyfriend, whom her mother didn't like. In that stage all her physical 
symptoms had almost vanished (Balint 1964 [1957], pp. 182-184). However, much of the 
discussion in the group was not about the case itself but rather on what Balint described as 
'Dr. R's rather forceful offer of himself as a father-substitute to his patient'(ibid. P. 184). Dr. 
R. did not hesitate to suggest his own views concerning some of his patient's most personal 
issues. For instance, he encouraged her not to feel ashamed of having sexual relationships 
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with her fiancé; on this issue, as in other sensitive questions, he had 'deliberately turned 
against the mother and sided with his daughter-patient against her' (ibid., pp. 184-185). 
According to Balint, the main achievement of the group in this case was to show Dr. R. the 
ways in which he 'was acting as an understanding, forgiving and powerful father. It was 
uncertain to what extent the patient should be made fully conscious of this, but it was certain 
that Dr. R. must become fully conscious of his role' (ibid., p. 188).17 The doctor must be 
conscious of his role not only to prevent any sort of inappropriate treatment but also because 
this role itself was flexible and can be changed all the time in the long relationship between 
the doctor and his patient.  
Balint used another case study to demonstrate his belief that the general practitioner must be 
able to provide flexible medical functions according to the patient's changing needs: 
When the psychotherapeutic relationship is broken off he [the doctor] changes back 
into a doctor; then he becomes a psychotherapist again, then changes back into a 
doctor, and then into an obstetrician... and finally turns into a "friend of the family". 
During all this he has helped an impossibly immature, severely hysterical neurotic to 
grow up into an efficient woman, a wife and, very likely, quite an acceptable mother 
(ibid. p. 169). 
We can see how Balint was mainly pleased when the general practitioner recognized his 
patient's wish to enter into this regressive role-playing with him, and also with his consent in 
participating. This case involves the doctor taking the role of the father, but in fact Balint 
thought that the paradigm for any kind of therapy is the maternal relationship between the 
mother and her baby. This approach was very much in line with other psychoanalytic writers 
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 Indeed, awareness was not only a medical injunction, but as Thomas Osborne pointed out, it was an ethical 
one. Drawing on the later work of Michel Foucault he argues that for Balint 'it is the self-labour itself that is to 
be taught. And central to this teaching will not be any moral rules or codes laid down by the doctor, but the 
exemplarity of the doctor'(Osborne 1993, p. 191). 
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of the period, such as Winnicott and Bowlby, as well as Ian Suttie before them. The common 
belief of these post Second World War theorists was that only the mother can supply an 
infant with continuous care which goes beyond language into a full understanding of his or 
her physical and mental needs.  
This new 'maternal' way of thinking can be demonstrated by the following case. MR. 
P. was a very disturbed patient who became obsessively attached to, as well as completely 
dependent on Dr. H., his devoted general practitioner. After much effort, Dr. H. managed to 
help him overcome many of his inhibitions, including his obsession with her. The participants 
in the group discussed whether she could then revert back to her old role as a 'family doctor' 
to him and to his family. Balint concluded this discussion by comparing the role of the 
general practitioner to the role of the mother: 'After all, mothers have to go on being mothers 
all their lives' (ibid, 210) — the implication being that the maternal role could never be 
relinquished. 
*** 
We can see that all the thinkers who have been discussed in this present paper claimed a 
strong linkage between regression and the maternal role. Ferenczi believed that déjà vu is a 
regressive enactment of a foetus's feeling in the mother's womb. This feeling, he believed, is 
part of an even wider regressive tendency of people towards an idealized archaic age where 
the entire world was one big ocean. Being in the mother's womb, he proposed, is not only an 
idealized time in itself, but a reliving of the best time of all in the evolutionary process of 
humanity. Ian Suttie portrayed a slightly different picture of the regressive tendency of people 
towards the maternal. The main problem for modern society, he claimed, is that it is 
extremely patriarchal, but also anti-maternal, since it does not leave any room for regressive 
feelings and regressive behaviour to recapture the initial bond of the mother and her baby. 
Finally, Michael Balint thought of the therapist as a provider of the maternal dimension to 
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people who have been deprived of good parenting, and who have therefore developed certain 
kinds of regressive needs. But to some extant, he thought, we have all been deprived from 
perfect mothering and we all have regressive tendencies.  
In 1968, two years before he died, Balint published his book, The Basic Fault: Therapeutic 
Aspects of Regression, which in many respects summarizes his theoretical work on 
regression. This book, however, also provides us with Balint's perspective of what one might 
call the history of the 'Ferenczian movement', in which the history of the concept of 
regression occupies a central place. Let him have the last word: 
The general view at [the time when Ferenczi died] was that [his] experiments had 
shown that responding to a regressed patient's cravings was a mistake; it caused 
endless and useless troubles both for the patient and the analyst, and was anyway 
condemned by Freud. For some time I tried to reopen the case by pointing out that 
this wholesale condemnation was both unjust and unprofitable. What I asked for 
was a critical reappraisal — not an uncritical acceptance - of what was valuable in 
the ideas developed in Budapest under Ferenczi's leadership. There was no 
response. Having failed, the only policy remaining to me was to continue with my 
clinical work and test the validity of these ideas by further experience. In recent 
years I think there have perhaps been some signs of a change in the general 
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